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Rather than ending the discussion, the first judgment of the ICC in the Lu-
banga case and its endorsement of the ‘control of the crime’ theory seem to have 
opened a Pandora’s Box of dissonant approaches to modes of liability before the 
ICC. Both practitioners and scholars have engaged in heated debates on the 
correct interpretation of Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute. Critics of control the-
ory rightly point out that this theory cannot simply be deduced from the wording 
of the Statute itself, and that it is not the only plausible theory. Yet, arguing that 
the ‘plain text’ of Article 25(3) provides a clear-cut, straightforward insight into 
the content and scope of each particular mode of liability seems somewhat naive. 
The wording of Article 25(3) is vague and leaves the door open to different views, 
as demonstrated in the wealth of recent related literature. Moreover, judicial in-
terpretation is an inherent part of the application of law and cannot be reduced 
to mere textual interpretation. Bearing that in mind, this paper provides a line of 
arguments that speak in favour of control theory. It is suggested that, while diffe-
rent interpretations remain possible, further endorsement of control theory would 
add to the ICC’s internal consistency and the development of an accessible and 
predictable body of law applicable before that court. 
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1. INSTEAD OF AN INTRODUCTION: A SHORT OVERVIEW OF 
DISSONANT VOICES ON MODES OF LIABILITY
From the outset, the ICC made it clear that when it came to modes of liabi-
lity it would not follow the well-established path taken by its predecessors, ad 
hoc tribunals and, in particular, the ICTY. In its early decisions, the Court ma-
nifestly rejected the (in)famous JCE theory1, and the dominant common law 
approach to perpetration liability. The ICC’s relatively consistent hierarchical 
reading of the modes of liability, coupled with its strong reliance on control 
theory, originally embedded in the German doctrine, has divided the legal pro-
fession by attracting both appraisal and fierce criticism. While some authors 
dismiss only the ‘control of the crime’ approach2, others reject the differential 
approach from the outset and advocate the unitary approach.3 
For a while it seemed that the critics remained ‘on the outside’, unable to 
reshape the ICC’s early jurisprudence on co-perpetration and participation. 
However, concerns about the ‘correct’ interpretation of the modes of liability 
under Article 25(3)(a) have lately been raised even within the Court itself. In 
his, by now renowned and meticulously analysed4, separate opinion attached 
to the Lubanga Trial Chamber Judgment, Judge Fulford disagreed both with 
the Chamber’s premise that Article 25(3) distinguishes between principal and 
accessorial liability, and with the application of the ‘control of the crime’ the-
1 Due to the malleability of the concept of joint criminal enterprise, its acronym JCE 
has ironically been interpreted to mean ‘just convict everyone’. See, e.g., M. E. 
Badar, ‘“Just Convict Everyone” – Joint Perpetration from Tadić to Stakić and Back 
Again’, 2006 International Criminal Law Review, no. 6, pp. 293-302. The term was 
first used by W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, 2010. 
2 Comp. L. Yanev & T. Kooijmans, ‘Divided Minds in the Lubanga trial Judgment: A 
Case against the Joint Control Theory’, 2013 International Criminal Law Review, no. 
13, pp. 789-828 and E. van Sliedregt, ‘The Curious Case of International Criminal 
Liability’, 2012 Journal of International Criminal Justice, no. 10, pp. 1171-1188, 
arguing that this theory is a product of judicial creativity, p. 1184.
3 E.g., J. G. Stewart, ‘The End of ‘Modes of Liability’ for International Crimes’, 2012 
Leiden Journal of International Law, no. 25, pp. 165-219.
4 See, e.g., K. J. Heller, ‘Lubanga Decision Roundtable: More on Co-Perpetration’, 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/16/lubanga-decision-roundtable-more-on-co-
perpetration/>, (last visited 10 February 2014) and K. Ambos, ‘The first judgment 
of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. Lubanga): A comprehensive 
analysis of the legal issues’, 2012 International Criminal Law Review, no. 12, pp. 
141-150.
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ory.5 He further argued in favour of ‘a plain text reading of Article 25(3)(a) 
of the Statute’ whereby, in his view, co-perpetration (only) requires the invol-
vement of at least two individuals, coordination between those who commit 
the offence, a contribution to the crime, either direct or indirect, which must 
simply be causally linked to the crime, intent and knowledge.6 Judge Fulford’s 
concerns were echoed in the subsequent concurring opinion of Judge Van den 
Wyngaert in the Ngudjolo decision of acquittal. Judge Van den Wyngaert 
endorsed the ‘ordinary meaning of Article 25(3)’ approach and, like Judge 
Fulford, found the ‘control of the crime’ theory to be inconsistent with it. 
In particular, she rejected control theory’s treatment of the common plan as 
an objective element, the idea that for joint perpetration it suffices that an 
accused only makes a contribution to a broadly defined common plan and not 
the crime itself, as well as the requirement of an ‘essential’ contribution. She 
further held that Article 25(3) did not create a hierarchy of blameworthiness 
nor did it allow joint perpetration and indirect perpetration to be combined as 
‘indirect co-perpetration’.7 
These two separate, yet concurring opinions have led other judges to as-
sert that the interpretation of Article 25(3) is “far from being uncontentious 
or settled”.8 While that may be the case, after scrutinizing the hierarchical 
structure of Article 25(3) as well as the hitherto dominant ‘control of the cri-
me’ paradigm, this article argues that both should be confirmed by the Appeal 
Chamber and continued to be applied by the ICC. The interpretation of parti-
cular elements of certain modes of liability may need further clarification and 
fine-tuning, but that does not mean that control theory itself should be wholly 
rejected. 
5 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute. 
Separate opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, T. Ch. 
I, 14 March 2012 (hereinafter: Separate opinion of Judge Fulford), paras. 6-8.
6 Ibid., para. 17.
7 Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Concurring opinion of Judge Christine Van den 
Wyngaert, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, Case No. ICC-01/04-
02/12-4, T. Ch. II, 18 December 2012 (hereinafter: Concurring opinion of Judge 
Van den Wyngaert), paras. 6-8.
8 Prosecutor v Katanga, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Germain Katanga against the 
decision of Trial Chamber II of 21 November 2012 entitled “Decision on the 
implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the 
charges against the accused persons”, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cuno Tarfusser, 
A. Ch., 27 March 2013, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3363, paras. 15-16.
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2. INTERPRETATIVE METHODOLOGY AND APPLICABLE LAW
Before turning to the issue of modes of liability, it is necessary to first 
address the principles and sources that should guide the interpretation of the 
Statute in general and, more specifically, of different modes of liability. The 
question of interpretative principles should be distinguished from the question 
of applicable law, which is set out in Article 21 of the Statute, although the 
two often seem to be intertwined.9 
2.1. The Rome Statute and its interpretation
Article 21(1) clearly establishes a hierarchy of sources. The Court should 
first apply its Statute, Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence. Other sources of law specified in Article 21(1) can only be applied if 
there is a lacuna which cannot be filled by interpreting the Statute and other 
primary sources (foremost by applying the criteria provided in Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Article 21(3) of the 
Statute).10 As noted by the Appeals Chamber, the Statute’s provisions are to 
be interpreted in line with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.11 This means that provisions of the Statute, including that on 
modes of liability, must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the language of the Statute, bearing in mind 
the relevant context and in light of its object and purpose.12 
When interpreting the Statute, according to Article 31(3) of the Vienna 
Convention and considering the context, the Court should take into account 
“any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
9 On that point, see L. Grover, ‘A Call to Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting 
the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court’, 2010 European Journal of International Law, no. 21, pp. 549-550.
10 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application 
for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-
02/05-01/09-3, P-T. Ch. I, 4 March 2009 (hereinafter: First Al Bashir Arrest 
Warrant), para. 126. 
11 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, T. Ch. I, 14 March 2012 (hereinafter: Lubanga Trial 
Judgment), with further references in footnote 2686. It is unclear why reference was 
made only to Article 31(1) and not to other paragraphs and Article 32.
12 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 United Nations Treaty 
Series (hereinafter: Vienna Convention), Article 31(1).
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the parties”. It is argued that this provision enables reliance on international 
customary law not only as a subsidiary source of law, but as an interpretative 
tool.13 It other words, whenever it is not clear that the drafters of the Statute 
purposely departed from it, the Statute should be interpreted in harmony with 
international customary law and other relevant rules of international law, i.e. 
general principles. Accordingly, ICTY/ICTR jurisprudence may be relevant for 
interpreting modes of liability pursuant to Article 25(3) inasmuch as it elu-
cidates the existence of a rule of international law.14 Given the difference in 
approach, the ad hoc tribunals’ case law cannot be ‘transferred mechanically 
into the system of the Court’15 and may only have a limited reach. Still, this 
provision may be seen as a powerful tool to avoid fragmentation and ensure 
coherence whenever possible. In fact, as noted by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights, the ‘international law background to the legal question before it’ 
must be taken into account even when considering the object and purpose 
of the treaty, as ‘the common international or domestic law standards of ... 
States reflect a reality that the Court cannot disregard when it is called upon 
to clarify the scope of a Convention provision that more conventional means 
13 See R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol. II, 1995, p. 
1421; R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
Vol. VI, 2012, p. 264; B. Goy, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility before the 
International Criminal Court, A Comparison with the Ad Hoc Tribunals’, 2012 
International Criminal Law Review, no. 12, p. 4. The so-called interpretation in 
conformity with customary law as a specific rule of interpretation in the field of 
international criminal law (whenever a treaty norm can be ascribed to a norm of 
customary law) is also highlighted by G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal 
Law 2009, p. 60 and V. Nerlich, ‘The Status of the ICTY and ICTR Precedent in 
Proceedings before the ICC’, in C. Stahn & G. Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice 
of the International Criminal Court, 2009, p. 319. Nerlich is, nevertheless, aware that 
this approach is open to criticism in the ICC context. First, it is questionable who 
the parties referred to in this provision are – State Parties or parties in a particular 
case. Moreover, it is unclear what is exactly meant by the notion of context and 
whether it refers to the law in force at the time of drafting of the Rome Statute or 
to the (customary international) law in force at the time of its interpretation (pp. 
317-324). 
14 But see Concurring opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 7, paras. 9-10. 
She is doubtful if customary international law may be drawn on by the ICC 
Chambers to interpret modes of liability and sees it only as a subsidiary source to 
be relied upon when there is a lacuna in the Statute.
15 This was pointed out by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Katanga. See Prosecutor v Katanga 
et al., Decision on confirmation of charges, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, P-T. Ch. 
I, 30 September 2008 (hereinafter: ‘Katanga confirmation of charges’), para. 508.
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of interpretation have not enabled it to establish with a sufficient degree of 
certainty’.16 
Finally, pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, in cases of am-
biguity or manifestly absurd or unreasonable results, recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including preparatory work. 
Whereas the above described framework applies to Statute interpretation 
in general, when it comes to the specific issue of modes of liability one should 
also bear in mind Article 22 of the Rome Statute which lays down the prin-
ciple of legality, the rule of strict construction and the principle of favor rei 
(interpretation in favour of the suspect or accused). The principle of legality 
undoubtedly applies equally to modes of liability as it does to definitions of 
crimes.17 Although Article 22(2) explicitly mandates strict construction only 
with respect to the definitions of crimes, this rule should apply equally to the 
interpretation of modes of liability18 since modes of liability form an integral 
unity with definitions of crimes and the mental element and are thus necessary 
to positively ground criminal responsibility from the perspective of substantive 
criminal law. Provisions on modes of liability link individual conduct to the 
crime and hence can be described as rules of imputation as opposed to grounds 
excluding responsibility. Only the latter may be extensively interpreted since 
such interpretation favours the accused.19 
16 See Saadi v the United Kingdom, [2008] ECHR, GC, para. 63 and Demir and Baykara 
v Turkey, [2008] ECHR, GC, para. 76. 
17 E.g., Prosecutor v Milutinovic and others, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion 
Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, A. 
Ch., 21 May 2003, para. 21 (according to which the law providing for modes of 
liability must be sufficiently accessible at the relevant time so that the person who 
acts in that way must be able to foresee that he could be held criminally liable for 
his or her actions).
18 See Concurring opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 7, para. 18. The 
same view is shared by W. Schabas, supra note 1, p. 410. But see B. Broomhal, 
‘Article 22’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article, 2008, p. 724.
19 See K. Ambos, ‘International Criminal Law at the Crossroads: From Ad Hoc 
Imposition to a Treaty-based Universal System’, in C. Stahn & L. van den Herik 
(eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 2010, p. 172. This view 
is supported by the text of the Statute itself since Article 31(3) gives the Court 
authority to consider other grounds of excluding criminal responsibility where such 
grounds can be derived from the applicable law as set out in Article 21. 
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2.2. Other sources of applicable law
The secondary and tertiary sources of law described in Article 21(1)(b) and 
(c) can only be relied upon when interpretation of the Statute itself (and Ele-
ments of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, where relevant) fails to 
provide a result.20 It is generally understood that the wording of Article 21(1)
(b) includes rules of customary international law. Therefore, even if customary 
international law cannot be seen as an interpretative tool in light of Article 
31(3) of the Vienna Convention, which is somewhat open to discussion21, it is 
germane as an autonomous, although subsidiary, source of law when the pri-
mary sources fail to prescribe a legal solution. The case law of the ICTY/ICTR 
hence may also be relevant here to the extent the Court finds it persuasive and 
reflective of the existence of a customary rule of international law (or even of 
a general principle). 
As far as general principles of law are concerned, given the diversity of nati-
onal legal systems in relation to defining modes of liability and punishing two 
or more persons who contribute to a crime in different ways, the role of gene-
ral principles in interpreting modes of liability will likely be limited.22 Finally, 
even though the Court is not bound by its earlier decisions, it may apply prin-
ciples and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions (Article 21(2)).23 
In fact, the Court has already done so on a number of occasions.24 This pro-
20 Katanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 15, para. 508.
21 See supra note 13.
22 There is a wealth of literature pointing to that conclusion. See, e.g., A. Cassese & P. 
Gaeta, Cassese’s International Criminal Law, 2013, p. 161; Judge Van den Wyngaert 
reaches the same conclusion in her Concurring opinion, supra note 7, para. 17 and 
so does G. Bitti, ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court and 
the Treatment of Sources of Law in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’, in C. Stahn & G. 
Sluiter (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court, 2009, p. 300.
23 The provision does not make a difference between decisions of pre-trial, trial and 
appeals chambers.
24 See, e.g., Katanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 15, para. 65 (‘no compelling 
reason to depart’) and The Prosecutor v Bemba, Decision pursuant to Article 61(7)
(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean 
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424, P-T. Ch. II, 15 June 2009 
(hereinafter: ‘Bemba Confirmation of Charges’), para 348 (‘the Chamber finds no 
reason to deviate from the approach and line of reasoning embraced by Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, as it is consistent with the letter and spirit of Article 25(3)…’).
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vision contributes to the development of a consistent and predictable body of 
international criminal law and thus serves the principle of legality.25
3. DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORIAL LIABI-
LITY AND THE ISSUE OF A HIERARCHY OF BLAMEWORTHINESS
The question of whether the Statute should be interpreted as providing for 
a differentiated and hierarchical system, which clearly distinguishes different 
forms of participation already at the level of imputation, has been seen as cru-
cial for interpreting the modes of liability themselves. On the one hand, the 
Court has so far rather continuously relied on the distinction between princi-
pal liability (described in Article 25(3)(a)) and accessorial liability (described 
in 25(3)(b) to (d)) to draw conclusions about the content and scope of modes 
of liability.26 On the other, Judges Fulford and Van den Wyngaert strongly 
reject such a reading of Article 25(3) and, consequently, dismiss the Court’s 
efforts to develop theoretical guidelines that would enable the delimitation of 
different modes of liability to avoid an overlap. According to Judge Fulford, 
‘the plain language of Article 25(3) demonstrates that the possible modes of 
commission under Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of the Statute were not designed to be 
mutually exclusive’.27 
The plain text of Article 25(3) does not provide an unambiguous answer 
as to whether there is a hierarchy of seriousness28, and makes it plausible to 
embrace the unitary reading and regard Article 25(3) as containing overlap-
25 M. de Guzman, ‘Article 21’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article, 2008, p. 711.
26 See, e.g., Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Confirmation of Charges, 
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, P-T. Chamber I, 29 January 2007 (hereinafter: 
Lubanga Confirmation of Charges), para. 320. Katanga Confirmation of Charges, 
supra note 15, para. 518 implicitly endorses not just the lesser blameworthiness of 
accessories, but also the lesser degree of blameworthiness of “merely order[ing]” 
in comparison to committing (through an organization). See also Lubanga Trial 
Judgment, supra note 5, para. 999 in which the Court said that ‘lowering the 
threshold [of the accused’s contribution] would deprive the notion of principal 
liability of its capacity to express the blameworthiness of those persons who are the 
most responsible for the most serious crimes of international concern’. 
27 Separate opinion of Judge Fulford, supra note 5, para. 8.
28 For arguments in favour of both readings, see A. Eser, ‘Individual Criminal 
Responsibility’, in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary, 2002, pp. 787-788.
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ping modalities of participation.29 Yet, most scholars read the dualist model 
into this provision.30 Indeed, the wording and separation of different modes 
of liability into distinct categories seem to demonstrate the preference for the 
differentiated model, especially when compared to truly ‘monist’ wording.31 
The mere fact that there may be some overlapping of some subsections of 
Article 25(3), foremost between ordering and committing through another 
person, does not militate against the distinction but, on the contrary, calls for 
an interpretation which helps to avoid such an overlap and the resulting re-
dundancy.32 Along the same lines, the ECHR has emphasized that a provision 
must be interpreted and applied ‘in a manner which renders its rights practi-
cal and effective, not theoretical and illusory’. It further endorsed systematic 
interpretation when it stressed that the Convention must be read ‘as a whole, 
and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony 
between its various provisions’.33 
Another argument in favour of the principal-accessory dichotomy, as poin-
ted out by the Trial Chamber in the Lubanga judgment, can be found in the 
derivative nature of modes of liability described in Article 25(3)(b) to (d). 
The provision’s wording clearly reflects the difference between liability for 
29 See, e.g., M. Dubber, ‘Criminalizing Complicity. A Comparative Analysis’, 2007 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, no. 5, p. 1000, who believes that the Rome 
Statute does not differentiate categorically between principals and accomplices. 
According to E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International 
Law, 2012, p. 86, ‘[t]he better view is to regard Article 25(3)(a) as containing 
overlapping modalities of perpetration and participation’. Yet, she seems to endorse 
the principal-accessory classification, mostly for fair labelling reasons (see p. 80). 
30 See, e.g., K. Ambos, ‘Article 25’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article, 2008, 
p. 746; Werle, supra note 13, p. 169; Schabas, supra note 18, pp. 424, 430-
431; S. Wirth, ‘Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Trial Judgment’, 2012 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, no. 10, p. 978; Yanev & Kooijmans, supra note 2, 
p. 804; S. Manacorda & C. Meloni, ‘Indirect Perpetration versus Joint Criminal 
Enterprise. Concurring Approaches in the Practice of International Criminal Law?’, 
2011 Journal of International Criminal Justice, no. 9, p. 167.
31 Wirth, ibid., p. 979, who quotes an Austrian provision as an example of a monist 
approach.
32 Such an interpretation may be seen as consistent with the doctrine ‘ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat’. For a plausible delimitation between ordering and indirect 
perpetration, see Goy, supra note 13, p. 55.
33 See, e.g., Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom, [2005] ECHR, GC, Decision as to 
the admissibility of the Applications nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01 by Stec and 
others against the United Kingdom 6 July 2005, paras. 47-48. 
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one’s own conduct and for a crime committed by another. Secondary liability 
depends on whether the perpetrator at least attempted to commit the crime.34 
Along the same lines, only those individuals who attempted to commit the 
crime are criminalized and not those who attempted to participate in a crime 
as accessories. 
Distinguishing between principals and accessories and between degrees of 
responsibility can be seen as an expression of the ‘normative’ or ‘top-down’ 
approach, which focuses on the notion of responsibility to pinpoint those who 
had a decisive influence on the commission of the crime and should therefore 
be considered principals.35 Not labelling as principal the liability of those at 
the top of the chain, even when they do not physically carry out the elements 
of an offence, would seem to reject the didactic purposes of the system of in-
ternational criminal justice and the often perceived need to establish a histori-
cal record.36 This value-based approach to criminal participation goes hand in 
hand with the purpose of the provision in light of the overarching goals of the 
Rome Statute and its unavoidable focus on the senior, most responsible per-
petrators.37 One could argue, in contrast, that the purpose of the Statute could 
only be referred to when deciding whom to charge and not how to charge. 
Yet, military and political leaders may assume different roles and not distin-
guishing between them depending on their actual impact on the commission 
of crimes would, arguably, defeat the expressive functions of international cri-
minal justice described above. Moreover, in light of experienced evidentiary 
pitfalls the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has recently been re-evaluating 
its original strategy that emphasizes the criminal responsibility of the most 
responsible senior leaders. Proving their criminal responsibility and gradually 
building upwards may require the prosecution to ‘investigate and prosecute a 
limited number of mid- and high-level perpetrators in order to ultimately have 
34 Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 11, para. 998.
35 For more about this approach and its opposite, naturalistic or empirical approach, 
see J. D. Ohlin et al., ‘Assessing the Control-Theory’, 2013 Leiden Journal of 
International Law, no. 26, pp. 740-743.
36 M. Damaska, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’, 2008 Chicago-
Kent Law Review, no. 83, p. 343 et seq.; War Crimes Research Office, Modes of Liability 
and the Mental Element, Analysing Early Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Court, 
2010, p. 57, <http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/report13.
pdf>, (last visited 4 May 2014).
37 H. Friman et al., ‘Charges’, in G, Sluiter et al. (eds.), International Criminal Procedure. 
Principles and Rules, 2013, p. 391. 
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a reasonable chance to convict the most responsible’.38 The OTP has also made 
public its internal policy decision to prosecute even lower level perpetrators 
where their conduct has been particularly grave and has acquired extensive 
notoriety. That approach will, it is hoped, be more cost-effective than having 
unsuccessful or no prosecutions against the highest placed perpetrators.39 In 
light of this strategy, distinguishing between different categories of principals 
and between principals and accessories seems even more important.
However, some scholars claim that adherence to differentiated modes of 
liability reduces the expressive value of international trials since different mo-
des of liability are unlikely to be fully comprehended within the national ju-
risdictions in which the crimes took place.40 Indeed, some domestic criminal 
law systems do not place an emphasis on the distinction between principles 
and accessories, at least not before the sentencing stage. Still, the distinction 
between perpetrators or principals on the one side and accessories or secon-
dary parties, on the other, has been embraced by most national criminal justice 
systems.41 It is therefore legitimate to maintain that a sophisticated under-
standing of the defendant’s relation to the offence is necessary to fulfil the 
expressive function of international criminal law. Making clear who the ‘real’ 
culprit is, i.e. referring to those who masterminded the crimes as principals, is 
important in communication with victims and carries the denunciatory and 
educational function.42 This is also in line with the so-called principle of fair 
labelling.43 In the context of the inherently collective nature of international 
crimes it may be seen as particularly important to ascertain the specific role of 
each participant.44 
38 Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan, June 2012-2015, 11 October 2013, para. 22, 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20
of%20the%20prosecutor/policies%20and%20strategies/Documents/OTP-
Strategic-Plan-2012-2015.pdf> (last visited 4 May 2014).
39 Ibid.
40 See Stewart, supra note 3, p. 215. But see Damaska, supra note 36, p. 353.
41 H. Olasolo, The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders as 
Principals to International Crimes, 2010, p. 15.
42 This was even recognized by van Sliedregt who in principle argues against 
hierarchical ranking and a strict distinction. See van Sliedregt, supra note 2, p. 
1185, with further references.
43 For more on the origins of the principle and its meaning, see Stewart, supra note 3, 
p. 176.
44 Comp. T. Weigend, ‘Perpetration through an Organization. The Unexpected 
Career of a German Legal Concept’, 2011 Journal of International Criminal Justice, no. 
9, p. 102. See further references in footnote 48.
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Another argument in favour of the differential reading of this provision may 
be found in the preparatory works on Article 2545, as well as in the ICTY case 
law as reflective of the fact that the dualist approach has most likely evolved into 
a customary rule of international law. Although, on the face of it, Article 7(1) 
of the ICTY Statute could be seen as establishing a unitary system, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber has quite consistently embraced the distinction between per-
petration giving rise to principal liability and participation in a crime committed 
by a third person giving rise to accessorial liability (and has thus distanced itself 
from the IMT and IMTFE, which adopted the unitary model).46 
Accessorial liability, at least in the normative model, connotes lesser liabi-
lity47, and this is precisely what Judge Van den Wyngaert rejects. On the other 
hand, Judge Fulford seems to be proposing that if any differentiation in the 
degree of responsibility is to be made, it is to be left for judicial determination 
of the punishment and not the imputation of guilt. Yet, while it is argued that 
differentiation in terminology and placement in separate categories would be 
superfluous if it did not imply different degrees of individual guilt to be ta-
ken into account when meting out the punishment48, admittedly neither the 
Statute nor the RPE attach strict legal consequences to such a determination, 
and accessorial modes of liability do not result in any automatic reduction of 
punishment for accessories.49 
45 Yanev & Kooijmans, supra note 2, p. 804.
46 Comp. Prosecutor v Krnojelac, Judgment, Case No. IT-97-25-A, A. Ch., 17 September 
2003, paras. 30, 73; Prosecutor v Krstic, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-33-A, A. Ch., 19 
April 2004 (hereinafter: ‘Krstic Appeals Judgment’), paras. 266-269; Prosecutor v 
Kvocka et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, A. Ch., 28 February 2005, paras. 
79-91. H. Alonso, ‘Current Trends on Modes of Liability for Genocide, Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes’, in C. Stahn & L. van den Herik (eds.), Future 
Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, 2010, pp. 522-524.
47 Schabas, supra note 1, p. 431. The same point is made by Manacorda & Meloni, 
supra note 30, p. 161.
48 Comp. Werle, supra note 13, p. 169; Manacorda & Meloni, supra note 30, p. 167.
49 The Statute itself does not explicitly provide that the mode of responsibility should 
influence the determination of a sentence, whereas under Rule of Procedure and 
Evidence 145(1)(c) the degree of participation of the convicted person is specified 
as only one of the relevant factors that should be taken into account. This seems to 
be the main argument of the majority in Katanga case for rejecting the hierarchical 
relationship between different forms of participation described in Art. 25(3). See 
Prosecutor v Katanga, Jugement rendu en application de l’article 74 du Statut, Case 
No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, T.Ch. II, 7 March 2014 (hereinforth: Katanga Trial 
Judgment), paras. 1386-1387.
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The ICTY has explicitly considered only aiding and abetting as a lesser 
form of liability, which as a matter of principle attracts reduced sentences.50 
This has led some scholars to accept the hierarchical relation, i.e. lesser bla-
meworthiness in the ICC framework only with regard to Article 25(3)(c).51 
Still, while different interpretations remain possible, already at first glance 
Article 25(3)(d) seems to set a lower threshold than Article 25(3)(c), both 
with regard to the objective (‘in any other way contributes’ arguably requires a 
smaller form of contribution than Article 25(3)(c)) and the subjective element 
(Article 25(3)(d) does not require a purpose of facilitating), which would spe-
ak in favour of a further gradation in blameworthiness.52 The Court has expli-
citly, on several occasions, understood this provision as serving as a residual 
mode of accessorial liability that is only triggered when the requirements of 
subparagraphs (a)-(c) are not met.53
With regard to Article 25(3)(b), in the Katanga Confirmation of Charges 
decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber implicitly held that ordering was a less serious 
mode of liability than indirect perpetration and the same conclusion could be 
made, a fortiori, with respect to the other modes of liability specified in Article 
25(3)(b).54 But even if ordering cannot be deciphered as less blameworthy 
50 Comp. Prosecutor v Vasiljevic, Judgment, Case No. IT-98-32-A, A. Ch., 25 February 
2004, paras. 181-182, Krstic Appeals Judgment, supra note 46, paras. 266-275, 
Prosecutor v Mrksic and Sljivancanin, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, A. Ch., 5 
May 2009, para. 407.
51 This view is expounded by Ohlin et al., supra note 35, p. 744.
52 Kai Ambos recently departed from his own, similar view that the wording “in any 
other way” implies a lower threshold of objective contribution in comparison to 
Art. 25(3)(c). He now argues that, in substance, both subparagraphs (c) and (d) 
provide for assistance liability and while both modes of liability may be seen as 
less blameworthy than liability of (co)perpetrators described in subparagraph (a), 
further distinction between (c) and (d) cannot be made. See K. Ambos, ‘The ICC 
and Common Purpose: What Contribution is Required Under Article 25(3)(d)?’ 
in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the ICC: A Critical Account of Challenges 
and Achievements, 2014, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2411981> (last visited 6 May 2014).
53 Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the Confirmation 
of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Case No. 
ICC-01/09-01/11-373, 23 January 2012, P-T. Ch. II, (hereinafter: Ruto et al. 
Confirmation of Charges), para. 354: Prosecutor v Mbarushimana, Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red 16, P-T. Ch. 
I, December 2011 (hereinafter: Mbarushimana Confirmation of Charges), paras. 
278-279.
54 Katanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 15, para. 518.
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than the modes of liability described in Article 25(3)(a), this is not a valid 
argument to reject the dualist reading and the dogmatic distinction betwe-
en different modes of liability altogether. A distinction between perpetration 
(principal liability) and participation (accessorial liability) is not necessarily 
followed by the mitigation or aggravation of punishment, and this is also not 
the case in all national jurisdictions that follow a dualist approach.55 The de-
gree of participation is just one of the relevant factors when determining the 
sentence. Nevertheless, even if different modes of liability do not categorically 
bear upon the level of punishment, as long as the law provides for different 
modes of liability these labels should be used consistently and Article 25(3) 
should be interpreted as containing four distinct and mutually exclusive modes 
of liability to be determined at the level of attribution.56 As far as the contro-
versial issue of hierarchical relationship between different modes of liability 
is concerned, it could be convincingly argued that Article 25(3)(a)-(d) is best 
construed as establishing four hierarchical levels of criminal responsibility with 
commission at the top, but currently there is an apparent divide within the 
Court.57 
In conclusion, a dualist reading of the provision, as setting clearly defi-
ned and distinguishable modes of liability, seems to be in harmony with the 
principle of legality as expressed in Article 22 of the Statute.58 Such a reading 
appears to be supported by the requirement of specificity (lex certa) which does 
not give the impression of being guarded by Judge Fulford’s loose approach 
enabling ‘a clear degree of crossover between the various modes of liability’. 
From the perspective of accomplices at least, attributing smaller degrees of 
blameworthiness to Article 25(3)(b) to (d) is also supported by the principle 
of favor rei.
55 Van Sliedregt, supra note 29, pp. 70-71.
56 Comp. Ohlin et al., supra note 35, p. 729 and Werle, supra note 13, p. 169. 
57 Werle argues that the value-oriented hierarchy of participation in a crime under 
international law stems from both the linguistic differentiation and the conceptual 
systematization of the norm. See G. Werle, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, 
2007 Journal of International Criminal Justice, no. 5, p. 957. On the other hand, 
whereas the Lubanga Trial Chamber (I) expressed itself in favour of the hierarchy, 
Trial Chamber II in Katanga rejected such reading of Art. 25(3). Comp. Lubanga 
Trial Judgment, supra note 11, para. 996 and Katanga Trial Judgment, supra note 
49, para. 1386.
58 Wirth, supra note 30, p. 979. See also V. Militello, ‘The Personal Nature of 
Individual Criminal Responsibility and the ICC Statute’, 2007 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, no. 5, p. 949.
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4. THE PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRE-
TING MODES OF LIABILITY
4.1. Rejecting objective and subjective theories of perpetration 
The ICC has so far consistently relied on the ‘control of the crime’ concept 
as a decisive factor for distinguishing between perpetrators and accessories.59 
Therefore, the control over the crime approach, at least to some extent, emer-
ges from the endorsement of the dualist approach. That is to say, according 
to the Court neither subjective nor objective theories can offer a reasonable 
explanation and coherent framework for differentiating between different mo-
des of liability.60 
The Court has rejected objective theories, which generally restrict the cate-
gory of principals to those who physically carry out the actus reus of an offence, 
based on the fact that the Statute clearly classifies as perpetrators those who 
commit a crime through another person (Article 25(3)(a)).61 At the same time, 
the Court has declined to follow the subjective approach and its manifestation 
in the ICTY case law, the concept of joint criminal enterprise – reasoning that 
the degree of contribution to a crime, and not the state of mind, should be a 
central element in determining the liability of principals. It has further reli-
ed on the distinction between Article 25(3)(a) and (d), arguing that had the 
drafters of the Statute opted for a subjective approach to distinguish between 
principals and accessories, those described in Article 25(3)(d) would be consi-
dered principals and not accessories to a crime, which was clearly not the case 
due to the explicit residual nature of that mode of liability.62 In addition, as 
the Court reiterated, the ‘control of the crime’ paradigm represents a plausible 
59 See Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 26, paras. 327, 332-341, 
reiterated in the Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 11, paras. 918-923. See also 
First Al Bashir Arrest Warrant, supra note 10, para. 210; Katanga Confirmation of 
Charges, supra note 15, paras. 480-486; Ruto et al. Confirmation of Charges, supra 
note 53, para. 291, Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta 
and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11-382-
Red P-T. Chamber II, 23 January 2012 (hereinafter: Kenyatta Confirmation of 
Charges), para. 296. For the most recent endorsement of the theory, see Katanga 
Trial Judgment, supra note 49, paras. 1382, 1394-1396.
60 Obviously, this is not a valid argument for Judge Fulford, who rejects the dualist 
reading from the outset. 
61 The term ‘commission’ is generally considered as synonymous with ‘perpetration’. 
On that point see Schabas, supra note 18, p. 427. 
62 The Court also compared Article 25(3)(d) with the concept of joint criminal 
enterprise.
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normative theory to hold responsible as perpetrators those participants who 
may have been remote from the scene of the crime, but still masterminded its 
commission, i.e. decided whether and how the offence would be committed.63 
Finally, the Court seems to have relied on subsidiary sources of law when it 
found the control theory to be widely recognized and applied in a number 
of legal systems and supported in the modern legal doctrine.64 Yet it remains 
unclear if the Court was implying that the theory formed part of international 
customary law or the general principles of law, as well as whether it referred to 
the doctrine in an attempt to establish the existence of ‘teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law’ in the sense of Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. 
Perhaps it could be argued that the Court implicitly found the ‘control of the 
crime’ concept to be rooted in a literal, systematic and contextual interpreta-
tion of the Statute in light of its object and purpose.65 Yet, others disagree, 
claiming that nothing in the text of the Statute or in its drafting history sugge-
sts that the Statute codified this theory.66 In addition, it is contended that if 
subsidiary sources are to be relied upon at all67, they should be interpreted as 
an argument in favour of subjective theories, as will be explained below.
Whereas the dismissal of purely objective theories can find quite strong 
support on the basis of a textual and structural interpretation of the Statute, 
foremost due to the fact that a crime can be committed through another bla-
meworthy person (Article 25(3)(a)), the rejection of subjective theories needs 
to be further scrutinized because it largely depends on the interpretation of 
63 Lubanga Trial Judgment, supra note 11, para. 920; Katanga Confirmation of 
Charges, supra note 15, para. 485; Lubanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 
26, para. 330.
64 Katanga Confirmation of Charges, supra note 15, para. 485 with further references 
in footnote 647. On the other hand, Trial Chamber II in the same case later 
emphasized that whether the theory is recognized in various national laws is not 
decisive as the Court must foremost apply its own statute. See Katanga Trial 
Judgment, supra note 49, para. 1395.
65 This would seem to be the position of the Trial Chamber II in Katanga case, when 
it found control over the crime theory to represent the guiding principle inherent in 
Art. 25(3), which makes the distinction between perpetrators of a crime and their 
accomplices effective and allows all the relevant provisions of this Article relating to 
individual criminal responsibility to produce their full effect. Ibid.
66 Comp. van Sliedregt, supra note 29, page 86. Separate opinion of Judge Fulford, 
supra note 5, para. 6 et seq.; Concurrent Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra 
note 7, para. 30.
67 Advocating a cautious approach in this regard, Concurrent Opinion of Judge Van 
den Wyngaert, ibid., para 17. 
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Article 25(3)(d). Some scholars argue that Article 25(3)(d) is not a manifesta-
tion of or a similar form to JCE, but a variation of aiding and abetting, namely, 
aiding and abetting group criminality and not individual criminality.68 The 
motivation behind this assertion lies in the proposition that if Article 25(3)
(d) does not codify JCE, the ICC would be free to import it into Article 25(3)
(a).69 Indeed, the two concepts cannot be completely equated. To start with, 
Article 25(3)(d) surely does not incorporate JCE III because it does not pro-
vide for dolus eventualis.70 In addition, if the dualist interpretation of Article 
25(3) is accepted, as proposed in the previous section, Article 25(3)(d), unlike 
JCE, cannot be seen as a form of perpetration, but participation, i.e. accesso-
rial liability.71 Another major difference between the JCE and Article 25(3)(d) 
responsibility, it has been advanced, is that a defendant under Article 25(3)(d) 
does not have to be a member of a group sharing a criminal purpose, but may 
be an outsider who assists others who are acting with a common purpose.72 
This allows the conclusion that the mode of liability described in Article 25(3)
(d) is simply another form of aiding and abetting – aiding and abetting group 
criminality, instead of that of an individual.73 The last argument, however, is 
not convincing. Reducing Article 25(3)(d) to a simple variant of aiding and 
abetting would render it redundant because the objective threshold prescribed 
in Article 25(3)(c) is already very low.74 Moreover, Article 25(3)(d) makes no 
reference to an inside or outside status at all and, in any case, accomplice liabi-
lity is not predicated on a determination that the defendant is not a member of 
a criminal group.75 Finally, nothing in the wording of Article 25(3)(c) suggests 
that it only incriminates aiding and abetting an individual. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this analysis it may be concluded that Article 25(3)(d) closely 
resembles JCE inasmuch as it reflects the idea of furthering common purpose 
68 Yanev & Kooijmans, supra note 2, p. 802. Similar views have been expounded by 
Ambos, who distinguishes between Article 25(3)(c) and (d) on a subjective level, 
see Ambos, supra note 30, p. 769.
69 As observed by J. Ohlin, ‘Joint Criminal Confusion’, 2009 New Criminal Law Review, 
no. 12, p. 412. This would seem to be the line of argument in Cassese’s International 
Criminal Law, supra note 22, p. 175.
70 Van Sliedregt, supra note 29, p. 146.
71 Schabas, supra note 18, p. 436. For an articulate list of other differences, see 
Mbarushimana Confirmation of Charges, supra note 53, para. 282.
72 Yanev & Kooijmans, supra note 2, pp. 801-803. 
73 Ohlin, supra note 69, pp. 411-412.
74 Eser, supra note 28, p. 803. 
75 Ohlin, supra note 69, pp. 411-412. This proposition was also rejected by the Court, 
see Mbarushimana Confirmation of Charges, supra note 53, paras. 272-273.
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liability, which has been at the core of JCE liability at the ICTY.76 Both con-
cepts emphasize subjective elements and not an objective contribution.
Yet, the subjective approach is also favoured based on the perceived need 
to avoid further fragmentation of international criminal law and any depar-
ture from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals. When interpreting the 
concept of commission introduced in Article 25(3)(a), the Court should, it is 
contended, draw upon customary international law which clearly endorses the 
subjective approach based on the JCE.77 Notwithstanding the appeal of this 
assertion, customary international law is a subsidiary source of law that can 
only be taken into account if: a) there is a lacuna; and b) it is not clear that the 
drafters of the Rome Statute created an independent body of law that must 
be interpreted independently.78 The wording of Article 25(3)(a) manifestly 
rejects ICTY/R jurisprudence as a basis for interpreting the concept of com-
mission, which is evident in the fact that it explicitly endorses the concept of 
indirect perpetration – a mode of liability not recognized as such by the ICTY 
and not applied by international criminal judiciary before the Rome Statute 
entered into force.79 In addition, if the words ‘jointly with another’ were to 
76 E.g., Ohlin argues that Article 25(3)(d) represents a statutory surrogate for JCE, 
ibid., p. 409. Similarly, T. Weigend, ‘Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-perpetration 
in the Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges’, 2008 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, no. 6, p. 478, who believes that Article 25(3)(d) certainly opens 
the door for the JCE doctrine. Van Sliedregt, supra note 29, p. 146 points out that 
JCE could come under 25(3)(d) under alternative (i) where proof of shared intent 
is needed; Boas claims that 25(3)(d) clearly refers to a theory of common purpose 
liability which is consistent with the JCE as developed by the ICTY. See G. Boas, 
‘The Difficulty with Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal 
Law’, in C. Stahn & L. van den Herik (eds.), Future Perspectives on International 
Criminal Justice, 2010, p. 516.
77 This seems to be a general plea of van Sliedregt, ibid., p. 16, in order to develop an 
integrated and consistent system of international criminal justice. See also Yanev & 
Kooijmans, supra note 2, p. 827. The Court has recently, however, emphasised that 
unlike international ad hoc tribunals, the ICC is not under an obligation to research 
if a certain rule or interpretation comports to international customary law. See 
Katanga Trial Judgment, supra note 49, para. 1395.
78 The latter equally applies to reliance on customary international law as an 
interpretative tool. Werle, supra note 13, p. 176. 
79 For an overview of cases before the ICTY/R that demonstrate certain elements of 
indirect co-perpetration theory, see Cassese’s International Criminal Law, supra 
note 22, p. 179. Apart from the Stakic Trial Judgment, which was overturned 
on appeal, the jurisprudence of the ICTY/ICTR has not used the term indirect 
perpetration when assessing situations such as that found in the Seromba case, nor 
when convicting under JCE for crimes physically carried out by non-JCE members. 
See Goy, supra note 13, p. 40.
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be interpreted to include common purpose liability akin to JCE (I or II), the 
drafters would have used the same terminology as in Article 25(3)(d) – and 
incriminated the commission of ‘a crime by a group of persons acting with a 
common purpose’. Any interpretation reading common purpose liability into 
Article 25(3)(a) would violate the basic rule of interpretation – that differences 
in wording exist for a reason, i.e. that they reflect differences in content.80
4.2. The ‘control of the crime’ paradigm
However, it must be admitted that setting aside subjective theories and the 
JCE concept cannot automatically be interpreted as the legal basis for adopting 
the control over the crime theory.81 Nevertheless, the dismissal of subjective 
theories coupled with the rejection of purely objective theories strongly speaks 
in favour of adopting a mixed, objective-subjective model of perpetration such 
as that expressed by control theory. Control of the crime theory, furthermore, 
provides for probably the most reasonable common denominator for different 
modes of principal liability specified in Article 25(3)(a), at least if subjective 
interpretation is rejected – it brings together, under the umbrella terms of 
‘control’ and ‘commission’, several modes of conduct (act-domination in the 
case of individual commission, functional domination in the case of co-perpe-
tration and will domination when it comes to indirect co-perpetration).82 Evi-
dently, control theory is based on the writings of the German scholar Roxin, 
i.e. on modern German theory and on just a handful of systems that follow 
it. Not only does this theory not form part of international customary law or 
general principles of law, but it is even questioned in the country of its origin.83 
Yet, contrary to Judge Van den Wyngaert’s view that reliance on ‘control of 
the crime’ theory would be permissible only inasmuch as it qualified as a ge-
neral principle of law in the sense of Article 21(1)(c)84, a theoretical approach 
may provide a coherent framework for interpreting the Statute.85 Along these 
80 Ohlin, supra note 69, p. 416.
81 Yanev & Kooijmans, supra note 2, p. 798.
82 N. Jain, ‘The Control Theory of Perpetration in International Criminal Law’, 2011 
Chicago Journal of International Law, no. 12, p. 165. See also Lubanga Confirmation 
of Charges, supra note 26, para. 332. 
83 Weigend, supra note 44, p. 99 and van Sliedregt, supra note 29, p. 87.
84 Concurring opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, supra note 7, para. 17. This also 
seems to be the conclusion of Judge Fulford, Separate opinion of Judge Fulford, 
supra note 5, para. 10.
85 In continental legal systems, this is sometimes expressed by an old Latin tag praxis 
sine theoria caecus in via. See M. R. Damaska, ‘A Continental Lawyer in an American 
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lines, Ambos argues that the validity of a theory is not geographically or cul-
turally limited. Instead, its reach depends on its persuasiveness.86 Subsidiary 
and tertiary sources of law would, hence, only become relevant if the Statute 
could not be interpreted in a reasonable manner. It is to be emphasized that, 
while the Court strongly adheres to the principle of legality, thus rejecting the 
judicial creation of law, judicial interpretation remains necessary to interpret 
dogmatic concepts such as commission and this is where doctrine is indispen-
sable. As noted by the European Court of Human Rights, ‘[i]n any system 
of law, including criminal law, however clearly drafted a legal provision may 
be, there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. There will always 
be a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing 
circumstances’.87 As long as the interpretation is foreseeable and accessible, 
it does not violate the principle of legality.88 In fact, the ECHR has found 
that one of the circumstances making judicial interpretation reasonably fore-
seeable is the fact that such an interpretation was supported by a number of 
scholars at the relevant time of the commission of the crime.89 Obviously, the 
ICC’s interpretation of modes of liability, unlike interpretation according to 
the principles propounded by the ECHR, should be guided by the rule of strict 
construction and the favor rei principle.90 Although this may not appear at first 
glance, the result of ‘control of the crime’ theory application seems to be in 
line with the rule of strict construction and the favor rei principle much more 
than the application of any subjective test. Grounding commission on the su-
bjective state of mind potentially broadens the class of perpetrators and leaves 
Law School: Trials and Tribunals of Adjustment’, (1968). Faculty Scholarship 
Series. Paper 1592. <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1592/>, (last 
visited 4 May 2014). A similar view seems to have been taken by the Trial Chamber 
II in Katanga when it referred to the ‘guiding principle’ (le principe directeur). See 
Katanga Trial Judgment, supra note 49, para. 1395.
86 Ambos, supra note 4, p. 143.
87 Jorgic v Germany, [2007] ECHR, para. 101.
88 In the context of the European Convention, an interpretation may even be 
progressive. The ECHR emphasized that Article 7 of the Convention cannot be 
read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through 
judicial interpretation, provided that the resultant development is consistent with 
the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen (see, inter alia, S.W. 
v the United Kingdom, [1995] ECHR, para. 36; C.R. v the United Kingdom, [1995] 
ECHR, para. 34; Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, [2001] ECHR, para. 50; and 
K.‑H.W. v. Germany, [2001], ECHR, GC, para. 45.
89 Jorgic v Germany, supra note 87, para. 107. This could well be the case here given the 
number of scholarly writings making ‘control of the crime’ theory reasonably 
foreseeable. See, e.g., Werle, supra note 57.
90 Which is not the case before many national jurisdictions and the ECHR.
Zbornik PFZ, 64, (5-6) 1039-1060 (2014) 1059
room for manipulation91, whereas requiring control as an objective require-
ment in abstracto serves to restrict the reach of this, highest degree of individual 
criminal responsibility. 
5. CONCLUSION
Several issues regarding modes of liability are still open for discussion and the 
debate is ongoing. This paper deals with only a fragment of this subject matter 
(that of the overarching theory), leaving the discussion of particularities of each 
mode of liability aside. In contrast to what some scholars and practitioners ad-
vance, objective and subjective elements of different modes of liability can only 
be ascertained following the determination of the guiding principles. In other 
words, one should first seek to answer whether Article 25(3) provides for a uni-
tary or dualist approach and, if the dualist approach is accepted, where the line 
should be drawn between commission and accomplice liability. Certainly, there 
is merit to the argument that the Court should strive to achieve greater harmo-
nization with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals in order to avoid unnece-
ssary fragmentation of international criminal law. Yet, this should not be done 
at the expense of the Court’s internal consistency and coherence. Although the 
Court is not bound by its previous decisions, it may apply principles and rules of 
law as interpreted in its previous decisions (Article 21(2)). As stated above, such 
a practice contributes to the development of a consistent and predictable body 
of international criminal law and consequently serves the principle of legality.92 
The Court has so far persistently followed the path of control theory which, as 
explained above, can be viewed as coherent and grounded in the Statute. While 
minor aberrations from the main route can be seen as fine-tuning93, making 
what may be seen as a U-turn in this field could undermine the Court’s legiti-
macy and its adherence to important general principles of international criminal 
law. The (appellate) judges of the ICC should keep this in mind when rethinking 
the content and scope of different modes of liability.
91 Weigend, supra note 76, p. 480.
92 DeGuzman, supra note 25, p. 711.
93 Upholding the control theory does not necessarily imply endorsing the current 
interpretation of all the elements of different modes of liability. For example, 
questions such as what is meant by ‘essential contribution’ in the context of co-
perpetration, whether the concept of indirect (co-)perpetration is inextricable from 
control over an organization, and so on, should be a matter of further discussion 
and analysis. Similar point has recently been made by K. Ambos, ‘A Workshop, 
a Symposium and the Katanga Trial Judgment of 7 March 2014’, 2014 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, no. 12, p. 229.
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Summary
     Maja Munivrana Vajda* 94* 
RAZLIKOVANJE POČINITELJA I SUDIONIKA PRED MKS-om – 
DRUGI POGLED NA TEORIJU VLASTI NAD DJELOM
Umjesto da dokine rasprave o tom pitanju, prva presuda Međunarodnog kaznenog 
suda (MKS) u predmetu Lubanga, kojom je podržana teorija o vlasti nad djelom, kao 
da je otvorila Pandorinu kutiju različitih pristupa oblicima individualne kaznene odgo-
vornosti pred MKS-om. I praktičari i pravni teoretičari uključili su se u uzavrele pravne 
debate o pravilnom tumačenju članka 25. stavka 3. Rimskog statuta. Kritičari teorije o 
vlasti nad djelom ispravno ističu kako se ta teorija ne može jednostavno izvesti iz izričaja 
relevantne odredbe samog Statuta i stoga ne predstavlja jedinu prihvatljivu teoriju. No, 
s druge strane, zastupanje stava kako sam tekst članka 25. stavka 3. nudi jednostavan i 
jasan uvid u sadržaj i doseg svakog pojedinog oblika kaznene odgovornosti čini se pomalo 
naivnim. Izričaj članka 25. neodređen je i ostavlja prostor za različita gledišta, kao što 
pokazuje već opsežna literatura na tom polju. Povrh toga, sudsko tumačenje inherentan 
je dio primjene prava i ne može se svesti samo na tekstualno, gramatičko tumačenje. 
Imajući to u vidu, ovaj članak nudi niz argumenata u prilog teoriji o vlasti nad djelom. 
Naime, iako su moguća različita tumačenja, daljnja primjena teorije o vlasti nad djelom 
doprinijela bi internoj dosljednosti MKS-a i razvoju dostupnog i predvidljivog korpusa 
prava pred tim Sudom.
Ključne riječi: oblici kaznene odgovornosti, počinitelji, sudionici, teorija vlasti nad 
djelom, Međunarodni kazneni sud
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